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Abstract 
Different evocations of “crisis” create distinct categories that 
in turn evoke certain social reactions. After 2008 Greece 
became the epicentre of the “financial crisis”; since 2015 with 
the advent of the “refugee crisis,” it became the “hotspot 
of Europe.” What are the different vocabularies of crisis? 
Moreover, how have both representations of crisis facilitated 
humanitarian crises to become phenomena for European 
and transnational institutional management? What are 
the hegemonically constructed subjects of the different 
crises? The everyday reality in the crisis-ridden hotspot of 
Europe is invisible in these representations. It is precisely the 
daily, soft, lived, and unspoken realities of intersecting cri-
ses that hegemonic discourses of successive, overlapping, or 
“nesting crises” render invisible. By shifting the focus from 
who belongs to which state-devised category to an open-
ended, polyvocal account of capitalist oppressions, we aim 
to question the state’s and supranational efforts to divide 
the “migrant mob” into discrete juridical categories of citi-
zens (emigrants), refugees, and illegal immigrants, thereby 
undermining coalitional struggles between precaritised 
groups.
Résumé
Différentes évocations liées au terme « crise » créent des 
catégories distinctes qui, à leur tour, sont évocatrices de 
réactions sociales particulières. Depuis 2008, la Grèce est 
devenue l’épicentre de la « crise financière »; depuis 2015, 
avec l’apparition de la « crise des réfugiés », ce pays est aussi 
devenu le « hotspot de l’Europe ». Quels sont les différents 
vocabulaires de crise ? Plus encore, comment ces deux 
représentations de crise ont-elles favorisé la perception des 
crises humanitaires en tant que phénomène de la gestion 
institutionnelle transnationale ? Quels sont les sujets des 
différentes crises qui ont été construits de manière hégémo-
nique ? La réalité quotidienne en temps de crise au « hotspot 
de l’Europe » est invisible dans ces représentations. Ce sont 
précisément les réalités quotidiennes, intangibles, vécues 
et non dites des crises intersectionnelles que les discours 
hégémoniques des crises successives, des crises superposées 
ou des « crises emboîtées » rendent invisibles. En déplaçant 
le centre d’intérêt des catégories définies par l’état, et des 
personnes qu’elles regroupent, à une description plurivoque 
ouverte des oppressions capitalistes, nous avons pour objec-
tif de questionner les efforts des états et les efforts suprana-
tionaux pour répartir la « foule des migrants » en catégories 
juridiques distinctes de citoyens (émigrés), réfugiés, et immi-
grants illégaux, et déstabiliser ainsi les luttes de coalition 
entre les groupes précarisés.
The way we treated migrants and refugees won back our dignity; 
we showed that we too have dignity. I do not distinguish between 
refugees and migrants. The one is not innocent while the other is 
guilty. We must become familiar with the notion of the migrant, not 
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only that of the refugee. We have refugees and migrants. We mustn’t 
be afraid to use the term migrant, nor should we hide behind the 
notion of the refugee.
—Yiannis Mouzalas, former Greek minister of migration policy1
At the end of June 2017, Yiannis Mouzalas, the minis-ter of migration policy of Greece, unveiled a public awareness campaign created by the International 
Organisation of Migration (IOM) in collaboration with 
the ministry: “Stop Mind Borders” targets stereotypes and 
prejudices against foreigners.2 Drawing on the experiences 
of racism faced by diasporic Greeks, the campaign asserts 
that the most important borders are those in our minds. The 
precise meaning of the minister’s remarks in the context of 
the campaign is unclear. On the one hand, by evoking Greek 
migrants’ experiences of racism in France, Germany, Aus-
tralia, the United States, and Canada, he seems to call for the 
abolition of the internalized borders between “natives” and 
“foreigners” and to mobilize empathy and solidarity with 
targets of racism, by emphasizing the interchangeability of 
positions between “hosts” and “guests,” “perpetrators” and 
“victims.” On the other hand, he is justifying institutionalized 
divisions between “refugees” and “migrants” (and, implicitly, 
“citizens,” whom the television spots address as their audi-
ence). He urges “us” not to “hide behind the figure of the 
refugee” in order to recognize that “we have refugees and 
migrants” in Greece. If, morally, he refuses to draw a distinc-
tion between them—“the one is not innocent while the other 
is guilty,” he nevertheless reasserts the existence of the two 
discrete categories. Why is this division between migrants 
and refugees so important to underscore in the context of an 
anti-racist campaign? What is the relationship between these 
forms of attitudinal racism and the categories of migrant and 
refugee that the minister invokes? 
This divisions between refugees, migrants, and citizens is 
at the heart of the hotspot logic, and the main thread run-
ning throughout this article is the way in which different 
evocations of crisis create distinct categories that in turn 
evoke certain social reactions. After 2008 Greece became the 
epicentre of the “financial crisis”; simultaneously, since 2015 
with the advent of the “refugee crisis,” it became the “hot-
spot of Europe.” Arguably, to become the latter, it first had 
to become the former. It is not incidental that in 2015 Greece 
was threatened with removal from the Schengen zone if it 
did not comply with the deadline of February 15, 2016, to 
implement the hotspot mechanism. This paralleled simulta-
neous threats of Grexit from the European Monetary Union 
if the Greek Parliament did not ratify the third memoran-
dum agreement with its institutional lenders. On the other 
hand, the Greek state in its public discourse linked the two 
crises, arguing that without the assistance of the European 
institutions it could not adequately deal with the emergency 
of nearly a million refugees arriving on its shores, because it 
was beleaguered by economic crisis. The hotspot became the 
means through which Greece was reinstituted as a sovereign 
state in dominant representations, while the unruly flows 
were used as a “bargaining chip” in its negotiations with the 
Troika (International Monetary Fund, European Central 
Bank, European Commission). 
We want to unpack the ways in which the first crisis was 
not resolved but was transformed discursively and institu-
tionally into the second crisis. What are, then, the different 
vocabularies of crisis? Moreover, how have both representa-
tions of crisis facilitated humanitarian crises to become phe-
nomena for European and transnational institutional man-
agement? What are the hegemonically constructed subjects 
of the different crises? According to this hegemonic logic, 
the financial crisis produced (economic) emigrants—Greek 
citizens moving to Global North countries—while the refu-
gee crisis (obviously) produces refugees. In the first instance, 
what is discursively marginalized is the inward and outward 
migration of non-Greeks, many of whom, already precarious, 
living through the crisis, lost their jobs and therefore their 
right to remain (or were undocumented to begin with). In 
the second instance, a hierarchy of suffering is constructed, 
whereby Europe is facing a severe refugee crisis, and the 
already financially imperilled nation-state that functions as 
its “gateway” is “burdened” by the task of separating legiti-
mate refugees from illicit migrants and identifying “terror-
ists,” who are hiding in the midst of “uncontrollable flows.” 
The politically urgent question to be asked is why the 
state would benefit from this separation between citizens, 
migrants, and refugees. We aim to explain that these realities 
are separate only in the technocratic EU documents drafted 
behind closed doors in Brussels; also, these categories are 
invented by states in order to control movement. The every-
day reality in the crisis-ridden hotspot of Europe is invisible 
in these representations. It is precisely the daily, soft, lived, 
and unspoken realities of intersecting crises that hegemonic 
discourses of successive, overlapping, or “nesting crises”3 
render invisible. By “nesting crises” we are referring to the 
dominant state discourse of a crisis within a crisis giving 
temporal and spatial priority to the “sovereign debt crisis” 
while the refugee crisis is constructed as a sudden problem 
first emerging in the summer of 2015. This renders invisible 
its prehistory, namely the criminalized migration of people 
into the Greek territory and the relegation of long-standing 
migrant and refugee communities in Greece to the socio-
legal margins of the society. By intersecting the discursive 
constructs of the financial crisis and the refugee crisis, 
what becomes visible is their constitution through mutual 
exclusion and prototypicality: the prototypical subject of 
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the “financial crisis” is the Greek citizen, while that of the 
“refugee crisis” is the displaced Syrian family who deserve 
international protection. Here, we use the concept of inter-
sectionality drawn from black feminist thought4 to show 
how dominant constructions of crisis create their normative 
victims, marginalizing experiences of social groups who are 
denied representational power. By shifting the focus from 
who belongs to which state-devised category to an open-
ended, polyvocal account of capitalist oppressions, we aim 
to question the state’s and supranational efforts to divide the 
“migrant mob”5 into discrete juridical categories of citizens 
(emigrants), refugees, and illegal immigrants, thereby under-
mining coalitional struggles between precaritised groups.
In this light, the article begins by unravelling the vocabu-
laries of crisis in order to make visible the connections 
between financial precarity, ongoing marginalization of 
different strands of the population, and implementation 
of the logic of the hotspot. It then moves to an analysis of 
the trajectories that have led to the intervention and the 
financial “rescue” of the country by the Troika and then the 
sealing of its borders by Frontex (European Border Agency). 
Following this pathway, it becomes evident that the logic of 
the hotspots was introduced in the years before the “refugee 
crisis” was declared. Here we make a threefold distinction 
between the hotspot mechanism, the logic of the hotspot, 
and the representation of the hotspot. By hotspot mechanism 
we refer to the approach to migration management outlined 
in 2015 by the European Commission (described in detail in 
section two of this paper). This approach embodies a logic, 
which nevertheless precedes it, of a state of emergency that 
can be managed only through the institution of a state of 
exception. Hotspot logic refers to the arrogated right of the 
state to define and divide people into certain categories, 
such as the refugee, the grantee of subsidiary protection, the 
asylum seeker, the vulnerable refugee, the unaccompanied 
minor, the economic migrant, etc. Finally, we use the word 
hotspot to refer to a representation generated by the hotspot 
mechanism, which spatially exceeds the actual migration 
management infrastructure and ends up being ascribed to 
entire islands, cities, and countries. For example, this spatial 
slippage is naturalized by the media spectacle of the scene 
of arrival in Lesvos, and the whole island is referred to as 
the hotspot of Europe. Moreover, after the EU-Turkey deal 
of 2016, Greece as a country is characterized as the hotspot 
of Europe—like the hotspot infrastructure, first becoming a 
space of transit and then a space of detainment. 
In the second section, we trace how the imposition of 
the hotspot regime has been legitimized by the discur-
sive construct of the “refugee crisis.” After shedding light 
on some of these concerns, the third part of the article is 
preoccupied with the ways the two crises create different 
categories of precarity, marginalization, and displacement. 
And, furthermore, how these categories then define who 
deserves “protection,” asylum, and the potential for a future 
within the borders of the European Union. Worse still, these 
state definitions trickle down to shape our conceptions of 
solidarity—even if their contestation on the ground offers 
promising directions for reconceptualizing vocabularies of 
solidarity in times of intersecting crises.
Vocabularies of Crisis 
Crisis is seen as a perpetual frame-breaking moment that, for 
people on the ground, dismantles the certainties and nor-
mative narratives of nation, sovereignty, social bonds, and 
belonging. The first superficial meaning of the word refers 
to a sudden change, a temporal interruption of a condition 
of normality. As such, the first etymological unpacking of 
the term crisis presupposes a former state of normality inter-
rupted by a temporal rupture, after which we imagine that 
ultimately normality and normativity will return.6 Following 
this logic, crisis is nothing more than a temporary, unstable 
period that will inevitably lead back to normativity. To quell 
suspicions that we are stuck waiting for nothing to happen, 
we are told by the UNHCR that refugees are resettled within 
fifteen years and by the Troika that debt payments will be 
completed in 2057, implying a resolution of “crisis.” In this 
light, narratives of crisis are animated by spectres of a pre-
existing state of normative trajectories (a non-indebted 
welfare state or a peaceful existence free of violence) that 
perpetuate the notion that crisis is a schism in normality that 
will eventually be mended. In other words, crisis refers to a 
moment of exception, but a curable one (if one swallows the 
prescribed “bitter pill”). Instead, the economic crisis and its 
ramifications become a (seemingly) permanent state of being. 
The result is a deep political and social sense of uncertainty, 
precarity, and dispossession. Taking into consideration the 
geopolitical shifts in the Mediterranean and Central Asia in 
the last decades (Arab Spring, wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Syria), it seems empirically impossible to foresee a return to 
normality, not least of all since it never existed. 
What needs further unpacking, then, is the interdepend-
ency between the dominant understanding of crisis and 
the implied return to normativity. In most debates about 
the current crisis, questions about the future are limited to 
asking when things will return to “normal.” In other words, 
the massive social and political shock of the crisis and the 
destruction of the material conditions it imposes create nos-
talgia for what existed “before,” an uncritical acceptance of 
the conditions before the crisis. Moreover, a nostalgic society 
caught in the etymological trap of the temporal character of 
the crisis is a society held in suspension, spatially and tem-
porally captive. Thus crisis evokes a certain embodiment of 
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time, since the past presents a haunting nostalgia, the pre-
sent is in crisis, and the future becomes increasingly impos-
sible to imagine or picture. The only meaningful future is 
constructed through a romanticized and nostalgic remem-
brance of the past. In short, crisis breaks the linear contract 
of time: looking back seems like the only way forward.7 
What then is important to this discussion of the vocabu-
laries of crisis is the notion that the future is now entirely 
uncertain or not a future at all, since it is the reproduction of 
a past that never was. On all sides, the sense of self, security, 
and capacity to resolve the crisis is being questioned. One of 
the most vividly invoked threats to the national self relies on 
medical metaphors, one of the favourite rhetorical schemas 
in the construction of crisis narratives. Crisis is a disease 
that needs to be quarantined and contained, whether the risk 
is “contagion” to the Eurozone, or “hygienic” threats to the 
populace.8 Crisis suggests not only the necessary climax of 
a natural process, but also proposes the “cure”: for example, 
the sweeps and arrests of HIV-positive users of intravenous 
drugs who are constructed as threats to “Greek family men” 
and are charged with intention to cause grievous bodily 
harm for selling sex (though none are actually found to have 
been).9 It is not incidental that Health Minister Andreas 
Loverdos characterized the arrested women as a foreign-
ers constituting a hygienic bomb and a threat to the health 
of the Greek family (despite that fact that all the arrested 
women except one were Greek nationals). To take another 
example, structural adjustments prescribed by IMF Director 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn were characterized as unpleasant 
medicine you for your own good,10 and in the first memo-
randum, as the “bitter pill” needed to prevent the disease 
from spreading.11 This kind of medical metaphor treats crisis 
as process, something inevitable that was meant to happen. 
The process of naturalizing the financial crisis leaves no 
room for questioning the structures, decisions, and value 
systems that brought us to this state of greed, consumption, 
and corruption. Accordingly, the naturalization of the refu-
gee crisis locates the problem in the arrival of refugees on 
Greek shores and leaves unquestioned the imperialist war, 
dictatorship, and displacement that are its root causes. To 
put it differently, the crisis is constructed as the effect rather 
than the cause. Moreover, nation-states and continents are 
figured as though suffering the crisis rather than people 
facing poverty, displacement, and violence. Thus, this dis-
cussion is focused on finding the right cure, and the ones 
who are attributed with the knowledge to do so are financial 
experts, political elites, and humanitarian experts. The cure—
whether it is the imposition of structural adjustments or the 
“triggering” of the hotspot mechanism—is delivered in highly 
technocratic language that leaves no room for any other kind 
of negotiation; at the same time, non-experts (almost every 
strand of the population) are put in the position of the mere 
observer. In the narrative of medical metaphors, nations are 
sick, not their banks or financial sectors; whole countries or 
their nationals need to be quarantined and contained rather 
than the global investments of bonds and capital. It is stand-
ard practice for agents of Frontex, coastguards, and military 
police to be issued gloves and masks for use when arresting 
refugees. Not only is crisis being naturalized, but also the 
reasons for its appearance are to be sought in the social body, 
and this further opens the space for characterizations of 
whole populations, such as the lazy and tax-evading Greeks 
are responsible for the financial collapse of “their” economy; 
the cowardly and opportunistic Syrians are seeking asylum in 
Europe rather than staying behind to defend “their” country. 
This is a religious discourse according to which crisis has 
fallen upon us like a natural disaster, as punishment for our 
sins: corruption, profligacy, tax evasion.12 And it is precisely 
this guilt that minimizes the potential for resistance against 
crisis and austerity, because crisis is the unavoidable (and 
even desirable) punishment for our sins, a situation that 
we must passively endure if we want to reach a moment of 
purification. In a sense, the “refugee crisis” has provided 
this possibility of redemption, and a renewed sense of dig-
nity for “Greeks,” as indicated in Mouzalas’s remarks in the 
epigraph. The civil society mobilization in response to the 
“refugee crisis” was invoked in state discourses as currency 
in a moral economy that sought to transform the prevalent 
perception of Greeks in the EU and beyond—from corrupt 
and tax-evading freeloaders to paradigms of hospitality 
and exemplars of “European” values of solidarity. A social 
body trapped in the spiral of sin and redemption appears 
to be waiting for its ultimate saviour: the prime minister 
who will stand up to the country’s lenders, setting course for 
the promised land of financial security; or Germany—the 
destination imagined by many refugees arriving in Greece 
whose only demand is represented as to be allowed to “go on 
to Europe.” The sinner and the saviour then become estab-
lished categories with their own racial, cultural, religious, 
and aesthetic characteristics. The most obvious example on 
a pan-European level is the migrant sinners who are “taking 
our jobs” and “take advantage of the welfare system.” In the 
transient state of crisis, the social body busies itself identify-
ing new sinners and experiencing collective guilt, or collec-
tive exaltation, which prevent it from organizing an effective 
resistance. Thus crisis functions as an opportune moment 
for the implementation of policies that would otherwise be 
controversial, since these reforms address not only political 
or economic exigencies, but seem to satisfy deep “spiritual” 
needs forged through religious discourses.
If we are to move away from mainstream, populist vocab-
ularies of “crisis” that are hegemonic, can we arrive at a more 
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dynamic, open-ended understanding of the phenomena 
they occlude, in addition to those they name. Indeed, the 
etymology of the word crisis (from the Greek word κρίση) 
suggests that in addition to the first sense of temporal inter-
ruption of a condition of normality, “crisis” also refers to 
the critical act of judgment and thinking, which indicates 
a space of meaningful self-reflection. Following this logic, 
crisis can be seen as an opportunity13 to redefine what had 
seemed unquestionable and fixed in years narrated as ones 
of development and prosperity. When the future is uncertain 
and suspended, the expected personal and social pathways 
seem more distant. Yet after the mourning of the loss of the 
grand narratives, a space opens up. It is in this space that 
the future awaits, together with the possibilities of different 
forms of organization and social action. As Craig Calhoun 
says, “Using the word crisis is commonly a way to try to get 
people to take action, to indicate that we have no choice but 
to do something. It is performative, not merely descriptive. 
It is a call to action.”14 The direction of these actions is not 
certain; there is no such thing as an emancipatory promised 
space per se, but the shifting societies and politics offer valu-
able and challenging terrains for contestation. The question 
becomes how we can move from the state of emergency 
(crisis, precarity, displacement) to a state of transition (cri-
tique, resistance, occupation), and then to one of emergence 
(solidarity networks, different social formations, alternative 
economies). In the ten years of crisis, the perpetual state of 
emergency—aspects of which are named and others elided 
through the concept of “crisis”—has been transforming/
transitioning into a state of emergence, precisely by people 
struggling to survive wars and “wars by other means.” Yet 
there is a border that runs through “crisis”; its concomitant 
discourses spatially and temporally create hierarchies of 
suffering, of human lives and deaths, in which those of the 
“European population” (however that is defined) is deemed 
of the highest order of importance. In the following section, 
we discuss how this border between crises is manifested 
through the hotspot logic. 
Vocabularies of Hotspots 
Welcome to Greece, a country on the European periphery 
after a decade of crisis. During the last ten years, the collaps-
ing health-care system led to a public health crisis;15 youth 
unemployment increased to 65 per cent, which caused a seri-
ous “brain drain;”16 pensions and salaries were cut, leaving 
one-third of the population living below the poverty thresh-
old.17 The country was variously named the “guinea pig” of 
Europe on which structural adjustments were tested, or the 
“pariah” of Europe responsible for the European crisis.18 In a 
way, one could claim that Greece—threatened with expul-
sion from the monetary union or the Schengen area—is the 
immigrant of Europe. In the same way that the immigrants 
are usually scapegoated as the reason for disorder within 
the limits of the nation state, Greece is scapegoated on a 
European level and accused of the destruction of Europe.19 
Greece is not only held responsible for the financial collapse 
of the European Monetary Union but also for its inability 
to control and seal its borders, creating the worst refugee 
crisis in recent European history. Welcome to Greece, the 
“entrance gate” to Europe for most refugees and undocu-
mented migrants. Welcome to Greece, where your presence 
as an immigrant and/or refugee is going to be used as the 
ultimate financial solution to the economic crisis. As the 
Greek state (and certain commentators)20 announced, this 
is a wonderful opportunity for Greece to navigate its way out 
of crisis—from “Grexit” to “Grecovery.”21 And indeed the 
detention infrastructure grew widely after 2015, becoming 
one of the only sectors of the economy that was function-
ing. By “detention infrastructure” we are referring not only 
to prison-style detention centres in which undocumented 
people are incarcerated prior to deportation, but also to the 
hotspot mechanism through which people are confined to 
the islands. We also consider the camp a form of detention, 
since people are forced to live there after their receipt of 
international protection, instead of being integrated into the 
social fabric. 
Since the summer of 2015, following the threat of a “Grexit” 
(a Greek exit from the European monetary union as a result 
of the “debt crisis” and the prospect of Greece defaulting on 
its loans), a new threat has been imposed on Greece: its pos-
sible expulsion from the Schengen zone, precisely because 
Greece has been increasingly deemed incapable of fulfill-
ing its role as a premier watchdog at the EU’s border with 
Turkey. Five “registration and identification centres” started 
operating in Greece, on the islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos, 
Leros, and Kos. The hotspot approach was presented by 
the European Commission in May 2015 as part of a larger 
policy push termed the “European Agenda on Migration.”22 
The agenda mandates the European Asylum Support Office, 
Frontex, and Europol to collaborate “with frontline Member 
States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming 
migrants,”23 dividing those eligible to apply for asylum from 
those ineligible, who are slated for deportation. Further, 
Europol and Eurojust are to assist the “host” member state 
in the dismantling of “smuggling and trafficking networks.”24
“Crisis,” understood through medical metaphors, discur-
sively justified the implementation of a system of “quarantine,” 
whereby the EU implemented the island detention model, 
known as the “Pacific Solution,” imported from Australia. 
The land border with Turkey had already been sealed in 2012 
with a 10.5 km fence, pushing refugees to make the more dan-
gerous sea crossing and effectively ensuring their arrival on 
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the Aegean islands that would come to be defined juridically 
as “hotspots.” In the first year since the fence went up, the 
death toll of the sea crossing increased markedly.25 This leads 
to our question, what came first? The crisis or the hotspot? 
According to the European Commission’s “Explanatory 
Note on the ‘Hotspot’ Approach,” what triggers the hotspot is 
a state’s own request for assistance to deal with “unmanage-
able” “mixed flows”: that is, people who will be categorized 
as asylum claimants, and those who will be denied the right 
to claim asylum and be deported directly from the hotspots. 
Rather than assume the self-evidence of these categories, it 
is important to note that this categorization is based mainly 
on nationality, but also on the date of arrival (prior to or 
after the EU-Turkey deal). Indeed, the hotspot system on the 
islands produces legal categories based on nationality; thus, 
the hotspot leads to an accelerated illegalization of most 
people who are channelled through its mechanism.26 Ironi-
cally, then, while the hotspot approach and the EU-Turkey 
deal claims to combat the “smuggling of migrants,” it argu-
ably proliferates clandestine routes, displacing them from 
the exterior to the interior of the national border—or, rather, 
displacing or multiplying the border itself. 
The hotspots, as they are described by the EU Commis-
sion, constitute an EU approach to “managing” what the 
EU calls the “refugee/migration crisis”: that is, the “mixed 
migratory flows” placing “disproportionate migratory pres-
sure at [the] external borders” of “frontline Member states.”27 
At the same time, we argue that the implementation of the 
hotspot approach cannot be analyzed separately from the 
“Greek crisis.” The hotspots constitute an approach to manag-
ing migrants’ “unruly” mobility and to managing what the 
EU constructs as a “rebellious” Greece, after ten consecutive 
years of economic “crisis,” teetering on the verge of being 
declared a “failed state.” Already relegated to an economic 
and symbolic periphery to legitimize the imposition of aus-
terity measures by the Troika, the Greek state was threatened 
with removal from the Schengen zone if it did not complete 
construction of the five hotspots prior to the deadline of Feb-
ruary 15, 2016, paralleling threats of “Grexit” from the Euro-
pean Monetary Union if it refused to implement mandated 
structural adjustments. Arguably, then, the hotspots on the 
Greek border islands have a double function: first, to identify, 
classify, and segregate people arriving on the islands, chan-
nelling and regulating their mobility thereafter; and second, 
to secure Greece’s faltering “Europeanness.” In other words, 
as ordering mechanisms, they “border” both the migrants 
and the islands: hotspots produce or enforce a border, clas-
sifying people into legitimate refugees and illegal economic 
migrants; and hotspots produce Greece as a border of 
Europe, or, indeed, as the “hotspot of Europe.”28 We refer to 
this as the double function of the hotspot, the “border within 
a border” erected to manage what has been termed in state 
discourses “a crisis within the crisis.”29
The question, therefore, is the extent to which notions 
of “Europeanness” become a tactically malleable and highly 
relative exchange value in relation to the convulsions of the 
expansive EU border enforcement regime. From the stand-
point of some of Europe’s beleaguered borderlands, therefore, 
the deepening integration of military tactics and humanitar-
ian techniques reappears not as a “solution” to the “crisis” of 
the border but rather as one more series of measures that 
will further escalate the (double) “crisis.” When referring to 
the “refugee crisis,” the Greek government emphasizes how 
Greece has shown a “human face” to the refugees arriving by 
boat on the Greek islands and has thereby purportedly exhib-
ited its “European values.” Emphatically contrasting this 
hospitality on the Greek islands with the implied or explicit 
allegation of “inhumanity” of the Turkish state, Greece effec-
tively re-inscribes itself within “Europe” by depicting Tur-
key as the site, just beyond the borders of “Europe,” where 
“the problem” of a “migration” or “refugee crisis” begins. As 
more and more EU member states were sealing their borders, 
effectively closing the Balkan route, which refugees had been 
using in their attempt to move deeper into “Europe” since 
the summer of 2015, the media began constructing Greece as 
a “hotspot” within Europe—or rather at the edge of Europe. 
Greece was reconceived as a transit space, but one in which 
thousands of migrants were now stuck or stranded.
Still, hotspots have other functions beyond detention, such 
as the redistribution of those classified as asylum claimants 
or refugees on the Greek territory—and beyond; the “reloca-
tion” of those granted refugee status to “Europe”; as well as 
the criminalization and deportation of “economic migrants” 
(or of refugees back to the “safe third country” of Turkey). 
These functions beyond detention are experienced unevenly 
by people pushed into these categories, given the construc-
tion and management of “mixed flows”: that is, the juridical 
entitlement of the EU to criminalize migration by denying 
international protection to those who cannot prove their 
persecution is “political.” Using the naturalizing logics of time 
and space, the state attempts to divide the “migrant mob”30 
into discrete, self-evident nationalities and to divide refugees 
and migrants from each other, but also from the local soci-
ety, including established migrant communities. The cynical 
use of the islands’ topography to divide the social body is a 
transnational, trans-historical technology of fascism: “unruly” 
political exiles were sent to remote islands during the junta 
in Greece, while the Australian offshore prisons of Nauru, 
Manus, and Christmas Island were exported as the “Pacific 
Solution” to stemming “unmanageable flows.” 
If seeking asylum has become synonymous in many 
jurisdictions with immediate (and sometimes indefinite) 
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detention, the hotspot model is about pushing the border to 
the mainland, refusing passage to the city, and facilitating 
the EU’s segregation and deportation projects. Resistance in 
and to this bordered reality means denaturalizing the logics 
through which land, sea, and sky become prisons. How we 
want to live, that we want to live, where we want to live, with 
whom, and for what—these are the simple decisions people 
negotiate through our struggles to a transnational regime 
that tries to run a border through our very existence. 
Intersecting Crises beyond State Categories
Intersecting the vocabulary of “financial” crisis with the 
vocabulary of “refugee crisis” reveals the indebtedness and 
contingency of both discursive constructs to the nation-state 
and the foundational categories that it invents to manage 
human mobility through time and space. In the previous 
sections, we contrasted the currency and mobility of these 
vocabularies of crisis to their immobilizing effects on human 
lives. Elsewhere we introduced the concept of the “mobile 
hotspot” to examine how the hotspot, as a condensation of 
the border, follows people who have passed through it into 
the interior of the national state and beyond.31 Intensifying 
the border, we argue, the hotspot is not just a spatial entity 
on the islands where people are made to register, are sorted 
out, fingerprinted, and classified as deserving or undeserv-
ing of international protection; it is a space of administrative 
violence that, in an accelerated manner, inscribes the ideo-
logical-juridical distinction between legitimate supplicants 
and undeserving “economic migrants” in detainable, deport-
able, and disposable human bodies. Keeping people in a state 
of perpetual immobility at and within the territorial border 
of the nation-state, Greece as the hotspot of Europe seeks 
to redeem itself in the geopolitical project of Continental 
integration.
The question “What crisis?” urges a destabilization of the 
border that runs through crisis. With the declaration of the 
“refugee crisis,” the state sought to re-establish its faltering 
sovereignty by reasserting its borders. Locating the state 
itself as the victim of “unmanageable flows,” the implemen-
tation of the hotspot system on the Greek border islands 
helped transform EU migration policy, but also to defuse 
anxieties about Greece’s diminished national sovereignty. 
After all, borders are the naturalized limits of the sovereign 
nation-state. Yet efficiency and rationality have replaced the 
institutionalized “Greek” racism exemplified in the era of 
“Xenios Zeus” (“hospitable Zeus”), where the Greek state con-
ducted police sweeps of the city-centre of Athens to identify 
undocumented persons by racial profiling.32 Such “primitive” 
methods are now replaced with a bureaucratic infrastructure 
that “sorts” people at all stages of their journey and tracks 
them in perpetuity. Thus our everydayness in the hotspot 
of Europe is being spatially and temporally fragmented 
through a proliferation of crisis logics. In other words, living 
in a hotspot refers to the spatialities and temporalities gener-
ated by the ways in which our very existence—in a bordered 
reality—has come to be constructed and perceived through 
the vocabulary of “crisis.” Yet the same violence as “before 
the crisis” is still taking place now, but now it is rationalized 
by the vocabularies of neoliberal crisis management. 
Crisis—in its soft, lived, invisible dimensions—con-
stitutes the daily violence of the operation of oppressive 
systems. Capitalism loves a crisis, the nation-state needs 
harsher borders, and our inability to view crisis outside or 
beyond the categories invented by state projects means that 
the hierarchies of suffering that useful crises (as opposed to 
accidental or unforeseeable ones) produce go uncontested. 
Why are “refugees welcome” while immigrants remain “ille-
gal”? Why did a housing occupation movement emerge (and 
gain international visibility) only with the arrival of refugees, 
while a massive increase in homelessness within a year of the 
imposition of austerity measures barely registered as a politi-
cal (and not merely a “social”) problem? Why is the Greek 
state collaborating with the IOM to combat racist prejudices 
now, when institutionalized racism has targeted immigrants 
for decades? And why are the experiences of emigrants 
(Greek nationals) constructed as morally or affectively leg-
ible in these campaigns?
Taking an intersectional approach to crisis discourses can 
reveal who is pushed to the margins through their mutual 
exclusion. Constructing the “financial crisis” as a “Greek 
problem” renders invisible the struggles of people residing 
and working in the Greek territory (often for decades, some-
times having been born here) who are denied citizenship 
or even permanent status and are perceived as increasingly 
unwelcome “guests” under conditions of austerity. Relegated 
permanently to the socio-legal position of outsiders, even 
fascist attacks on non-nationals are justified by the hostile 
climate of austerity, while their experiences of unemploy-
ment, loss of legal status, homelessness, and return migra-
tion do not figure as effects of the “sovereign debt crisis.”33 
On the other hand, constructing the “refugee crisis” as a 
sudden event with a determinate historical beginning—like 
a natural disaster—enables the histories and trajectories of 
forced migration over the past three decades to be forgotten, 
and the precarity to which “illegal immigrants” (as they were 
castigated in dominant discourses) were subjected in Greece. 
It is worth recalling that prior to the institution of the hotspot 
mechanism, asylum applications in Greece were approved at 
a rate of less than 1 per cent; a mere year after the declaration 
of the “refugee crisis,” and six months after the implementa-
tion of the EU-Turkey deal, approval rates have descended to 
nearly the same level (1.23 per cent between July 21, 2016, and 
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March 31, 2017).34 Moreover, intersecting the “financial crisis” 
with the “refugee crisis” means rejecting the false division 
between the economic and the political, between class and 
citizenship, between elective and forced migration. These 
(and other undeclared crises) are intersecting crises in the 
sense that they converge in people’s lives (e.g., those migrat-
ing to escape endemic poverty due to structural adjustment 
policies, or debt colonialism).
Returning to Mouzalas’s words with which we began, citi-
zens are those who are empowered to understand that “the 
one [refugee] is not innocent, while the other [immigrant] 
is guilty.” Mouzalas’s explicit aim is to refute racial animus; 
but the implicit meaning of what he is saying becomes clear 
if we examine the infrastructure behind the anti-racist cam-
paign. The former produces racial categories, while the latter 
denounces their use by citizens. Citizens should not be suspi-
cious of foreign others in an age of migration management, 
which enables the state to ensure their safety by dividing the 
“dangerous” from the “deserving” who make it across the bor-
der. In this sense, while reaffirming that migrants are always 
already guilty—criminalized by definition—Mouzalas implies 
the refugee is not (always) innocent, or cannot be assumed to 
be. It is not incidental that, in order to be relocated, refugees 
have to undergo a “security” interview, where they are asked 
their opinion about such matters as the terrorist attacks in 
France or Germany. The administrative mechanism probes 
their guilt, in order to determine who are properly “innocent” 
and politically innocuous, and who pose a threat. 
Those who have lived in Greece with precarious, unde-
cided, or temporary status for decades are irrelevant in the 
sense that the “refugee crisis” has completely marginalized 
them: their asylum claims or stay applications have been on 
hold for years, constantly being postponed, while (at least 
some) people who arrived months ago have already been 
relocated. Somehow the arrival of the former in Greece never 
constituted a “crisis” for anyone but themselves. Moreover, 
they are now being invited to staff the hotspot infrastruc-
ture, the NGO infrastructure, and even the military, to enable 
the state to exploit their linguistic and cultural “capital.” For 
many people who have been on the edge of the margin pre-
cisely as a result of their migration status, finding work in the 
“emerging economy”35 of migration management comes as a 
relief after having suffered (possibly more than) ten years 
of unemployment, of inaccessible education, of loved ones 
departing, of being unable to visit loved ones—of waiting, 
for nothing to happen. 
But now something is happening that at first seemed to 
change everything. A demoralized, demobilized people were 
awakened to solidarity (or so the representation goes) with 
people arriving who had suffered worse than they or had just 
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